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CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE PRESIDENT:
REVIEWING THE STATE OF LAW IN THE FACE OF A
TRUMP PRESIDENCY
M.C.E. ∗
“No one can serve two masters. Either you will hate the one and love the
other, or you will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot
serve both God and money.” 1 It is not a novel concept that competing personal
interests rob us of our ability to make impartial and objective decisions. For
this reason, the need to avoid conflicts of interests comprises a main tenet of
our system of due process. Recognition that we, as mere humans, unavoidably
root our bias in decision-making is at the core of our process for governing the
disqualification of judges and attorneys, and of course in selecting juries.
This avoidance of conflicts supports confidence in the implementation of
our substantive rule of law. Our focus on process as a means to secure
substantive law and compliant enforcement is what distinguishes Western, and
in particular American, rule of law. It is by this process that we create trust in
our legal system—we may not all agree with the substantive law or its
implementation, but we can at least respect that it was derived from a process
with integrity. At its core, minimizing conflicts of interests is a critical
mechanism to ensure unbiased decision-making in the legal system in the same
way a scientist would use a control mechanism in a lab experiment.
This concept does not stop with the legal system—most government
officials are subject to some conflict of interest standard, whether via the
Constitution, agency rules and regulation, statute, or contract. Two notable
exceptions are the president and vice president. These exceptions are based on
the policy rationale that any prohibition against conflicts of interests might
impede their ability to carry out their Constitutional duties. However, on
November 8, 2016, Donald John Trump was elected to be the 45th President of
the United States of America, bringing with him an unprecedented level of
potential conflicts of interest.

∗ Due to fear of retribution against the author’s employer, she is not able to publish this article under her
real name.
1 Luke 16:13; Matthew 6:24.
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This is not the first time a business magnate has ascended to an executive
office. In 1974, President Gerald Ford nominated Nelson A. Rockefeller for
the office of the Vice President. Following Rockefeller’s nomination, there
was a great deal of concern over “the public-policy implications of a nominee
whose vast financial holdings touch many segments of the American economic
system.” 2 Rockefeller’s business interests and finances were subjected to
intense scrutiny, including two sets of Senate hearings in the fall of 1974 and
an audit by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation of his 1964–
1973 federal income tax returns.
Rockefeller had only negligible ownership (a.k.a. less than 0.2%) in
Standard Oil Co. of California or any other oil company; his family’s holdings
in the same company totaled only 2.06%, and this was also their largest
holding in any single oil company. Rockefeller testified that his family had “no
control of any kind over the management or policies” of Standard Oil of
California or any other oil company.” 3 Moreover, Rockefeller testified that he
was having a blind trust prepared in which he was prepared to put all of his
personally-held securities should he be requested to do so by Congress—it was
ultimately decided this would be useless as Rockefeller would still be aware of
his personal and family interests. During the hearings, Senator Robert C. Byrd
(D W.Va.) postulated if Rockefeller himself “may be conscious of the power
that the two [great political power and extensive economic influence] when
combined really add up to. . . . I wonder if you can separate the interest of big
business and the national interest when they diverge.” Ultimately, the
Committee was persuaded by Rockefeller’s candor and straightforwardness,
determining that his public disclosure of his holdings would “permit a
monitoring of those business interests by the public and the news media that
would be adequate.” 4
Despite the face-value similarities, a closer look reveals stark differences in
both the extent of Mr. Trump’s potential conflicts, as well as his handling of
any such conflicts. As of September 2016, Mr. Trump’s total net worth was
estimated to be a whopping $3.7 billion. He is currently the sole or principal
owner of the approximately 500 business entities which compromise the

2 Hearings on Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York to be Vice President of the United
States Before the Senate Comm. On Rules and Administration, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39–79 (1974).
3 “Rockefeller Becomes 41st Vice President,” CQ ALMANAC 1974, at 917–35 (30th ed. 1975),
https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal74-1223238.
4 Id.
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Trump Organization, spread across at least 20 countries. 5 Mr. Trump has filed
the requisite financial disclosure report, but he has repeatedly refused to
produce his tax returns despite repeated requests to do so, claiming he is
currently being audited (despite his attorney having confirmed his pre-2009
taxes are no longer being audited). 6 Similar to Rockefeller, Mr. Trump’s
placement of his assets into a blind trust would likely be ineffective given his
intimate knowledge of his self-titled empire. However, unlike Rockefeller, Mr.
Trump has never offered to place his holdings in a blind trust. Rather, he has
announced he will be turning over control of his empire to his three children—
Ivanka, Donald Jr., and Eric—all three of whom Mr. Trump is simultaneously
relying upon to help curate the next government as members of the executive
committee of his transition team.
This article will provide a brief sample of Mr. Trump’s potential conflicts,
both international and domestic; examine the current state of laws that could
potentially limit a president’s ability to engage in interested transactions;
assess the effects of exempting such a powerful member of the government
from conflict of interest standards; and discuss what, if any, limitations the
office of the president should be subjected to avoid conflicts of interest.
Potential and Current “Conflicts”
Mr. Trump’s extensive businesses spark an array of potential conflicts
across the globe. However, despite Mr. Trump’s frequent discussion of his
business empire and unabashed promotion of his own brand during the
campaign, there was relatively little pre-election interest in discussing exactly
what Mr. Trump intended to do with his Trump empire if elected. 7 During a
Fox business debate, Mr. Trump said if he became president, he “couldn’t care

5 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, “Status of U.S. federal income tax returns” (March 7, 2016),
https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/Tax_Doc.pdf;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2838696-Trump2016-Financial-Disclosure.html.
6 Id.
7 Meg Anderson, Trump Often Uses The Campaign Spotlight To Promote His Own Brand, NPR.COM
(Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/10/26/499441383/trump-often-uses-the-campaign-spotlight-topromote-his-own-brand.
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less about [his] company.” 8 Looking back, the fact that Trump was unaware of
the definition of a “blind trust” probably should have been a red flag. 9
Not surprisingly, since being elected, Mr. Trump has declined to liquidate
his assets (which is arguably not even an economic or legally feasible option)
and place them in a truly blind trust. 10 Instead, as mentioned above, Mr. Trump
has announced he will turn over management of his businesses to his
children—Ivanka, Eric and Donald, Jr. 11 Mr. Trump previously scheduled a
press conference for December 15, 2016 to discuss more in-depth the plan for
handling his expansive conflicts of interests, but mere days before it was to
take place the conference was postponed until January without further
elaboration on Mr. Trump’s exact plans. 12 Regardless of the ultimate details of
the arrangement, any benefit from this arrangement in terms of reducing
conflicts is undermined by Mr. Trump’s simultaneous decision to also appoint
these same three children to his transition team.
One example of Trump’s international conflicts of interest is his investment
dealings in the Philippines. In October, Mr. Trump’s partner in a $150 million
development project in the Philippines, Jose E. B. Antonio, was named a
special envoy to the United States by President Rodrigo Duterte. 13 Following
the election, Mr. Antonio came to the United States on a “business,” and not
“political” trip, and met with Mr. Trump’s children. Relations with the
Philippines have recently been tense, and there is a fear that Mr. Trump’s ties
to the Philippines, both personal and financial, could compromise America’s
efforts to criticize the ongoing intermingling of state power and business
entities of the Pilipino political elite.
8 Kate Taylor, “Here’s what will happen to Trump’s businesses now that he’s going to be president,”
BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-will-happen-to-trump-businesses2016-11.
9 Steven Benen, “Why Trump’s confusion about what a ‘blind trust’ is matters,” MSNBC (Jan. 8,
12:30am),
http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/why-trumps-confusion-about-what-blind-trustmatters.
10 Jennifer Wang. Why Trump Won’t Use A Blind Trust And What His Predecessors Did With Their
Assets, Forbes (Nov. 15, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferwang/2016/11/15/why-trump-wont-use-ablind-trust-and-what-his-predecessors-did-with-their-assets/#5a8bb2267915.
11 Danielle Wiener-Bronner, Trump to turn over business empire to his children, CNN Money (Nov. 11,
2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/11/news/trump-transfers-business/.
12 Jennifer Wang, Trump Postpones Press Conference Meant To Address Conflict Of Interest Issues,
Forbes (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferwang/2016/12/12/trump-postpones-pressconference-meant-to-address-conflict-of-interest-issues/#29a24ef06147.
13 Richard C. Paddock, et al., Potential Conflicts Around the Globe for Trump, the Businessman
President (Nov. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/26/us/politics/donald-trump-internationalbusiness.html?mwrsm=Email&_r=0.
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Another example is Mr. Trump’s use of a direct appeal to a foreign
politician to support personally beneficial regulatory change. Several days after
the election, Nigel Farage of the U.K. Independence Party (UKIP) met with
Mr. Trump in New York. During their conversation, Trump allegedly
encouraged Farage to campaign against wind farms. 14 Mr. Trump has
previously campaigned himself against wind farms as he believes they will
tarnish the view from his two Scottish golf courses.
As to Mr. Trump’s children, in October, Donald Jr. met with diplomats,
businessmen and politicians—including pro-Russian figures—in Paris to
discuss formulating a plan to work with Russia to end the war in Syria. 15
Donald Jr. was also seen hunting in Turkey shortly after his father’s call with
President Erdogan.
Mere days after the election, all three children attended a meeting between
Mr. Trump and several Indian real-estate executives who are in the process of
erecting a Trump-brand apartment complex in Mumbai. Mr. Trump decried
accusations that the meeting undermined his recent assurances that he would
be stepping away from control of Trump Organization, characterizing the
meeting as merely an informal congratulations. However, according to one of
the executive-attendees, during the meeting Donald Jr. expressed interest in
expanding the pace of Trump Organization’s India business. 16
Several days later, Ivanka, who is allegedly closing a business deal with a
Japanese clothing company whose largest stakeholder is the Japanese
government, sat in on a meeting between President-elect Trump and Japan’s
Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe. 17
There are also numerous potential domestic conflicts. Mr. Trump’s election
raises multiple issues with the Old Post Office Pavilion deal alone. The 60-year
14 Danny Hakim and Eric Lipton, With a Meeting, Trump Renewed a British Wind Farm Fight, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/business/with-a-meeting-trump-renewed-abritish-wind-farm-fight.html.
15 Jay Solomon, Donald Trump Jr. Held Talks on Syria With Russia Supporters, WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Nov. 23, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-jr-held-talks-on-syria-with-russia-supporters1479920753.
16 Kailash Babar, Donald Trump Meets Indian Partners, Hails PM Modi’s Work, The Economic Times
(Nov. 17, 2016), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/donald-trump-meets-indianpartners-hails-pm-modiswork/articleshow/55465060.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.
17 Felkis Garcia, Ivanka Trump was closing business deal in Japan when pictured with Donald Trump
and Shinzo Abe, THE INDEPENDENT (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/ivanka-trumpjapan-business-deal-donald-trump-shinzo-abe-prime-minister-a7457161.html.
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long lease is between the General Services Administration (the “GSA”), whose
administration will be appointed by Mr. Trump, and Trump Old Post Office
LLC, which is a part of Trump Organization and thus will be run by Mr.
Trump’s children. 18 As such, Mr. Trump’s children will be conducting
necessary lease re-negotiations with a GSA employee who reports to their
father’s appointee—just imagine negotiating the sale of a car to the children of
your boss’s boss. Moreover, the lease contains a provision stating “no . . .
elected official of the Government of the United States . . . shall be admitted to
any share or part of this Lease, or to any benefit that may arise therefrom.” 19
Mr. Trump currently has a 76.725% personal ownership interest in the lease. 20
Apart from this potential breach, Mr. Trump has conceded the perceived
increase in value of supporting his business, and the potential that people may
perceive this as expressing support for him personally: “I mean it could be that
occupancy at that [Old Post office] hotel will be because, psychologically,
occupancy at that hotel will be probably a more valuable asset now than it was
before, O.K.? . . . .” 21 Despite this, the Trump Organization has urged
diplomats to consider patronizing this hotel when in town to meet with Mr.
Trump or his team. 22
Additionally, Mr. Trump’s supervisory role over agencies handling
conflicts involving his companies could impair the agencies’ abilities to make
fair determinations. For instance, Mr. Trump will oversee the National Labor
Relations Board while it decides any union disputes involving his hotels. As an
example, a mere week before the election, the board ruled against Trump
International Hotel in Las Vegas. 23 How many people would be willing to get

18 Steven L. Schooner and David I. Gordon, Trump leases his D.C. from a government agency he’ll soon
be in charge of, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/
wp/2016/11/15/trump-needs-to-give-up-his-trump-hotel-lease-right-now/?utm_term=.0ac6d6bba24a.
19 Ground Lease between The United States of America and Trump Old Post Office LLC (the “Ground
Lease”), at § 37.19, available at https://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/305477.
20 Ground Lease, Exhibit G (Ownership Affidavit/Organization Chart), available at https://www.
documentcloud.org/documents/3000979-Exhibit-G-After-FOIA-APPEAL.html. Donald Trump owns 76.725%
of the Trump Old Post Office LLC through a company called DJT Holdings, LLC, which is 100% owned by
Trump’s revocable trust. Executive Branch Personnel Financial Disclosure Report (May 16, 2016), at p. 62,
available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2838686-5-18-16-Report.html#document/p62/a311
861. The remaining 22.275% ownership interest is shared equally among Ivanka OPO LLC, Don OPO LLC,
and Eric OPO LLC. Id.
21 Paddock, supra note 13.
22 Id.
23 Cogan Schneier, Labor Board: Trump hotel violated labor law, POLITICO.COM (Nov. 3, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/labor-board-trump-hotel-230720.
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their boss’s kid in trouble—especially when their boss would have to partly
foot the bill for any penalty?
Another example is that Mr. Trump’s transition team, including his three
eldest children, will be selecting an attorney general. This same attorney
general will head the Justice Department, which recently made a $14 billion
opening bid in its settlement negotiations with Deutsche Bank concerning
claims related to the bank’s handling of the mortgage-backed securities leading
to the 2008 financial crisis. 24 Deutsche Bank is one of Trump Organization’s
biggest lenders, and now Mr. Trump and his children might potentially handselect the person who sits across the table from Deutsche Bank in settlement
discussions.
These conflicts create a complicated network of choices where Mr. Trump
must choose between his personal financial interests and his duty to the
presidency.
Conflict of Interest Laws
Legally speaking, the president is not subject to any conflict of interest law
simply by virtue of his or her office. Title 18 Section 208 of the United States
Code is the relevant provision concerning conflicts of interest of officers and
employees of the executive branch. This provision generally prohibits an
officer or employee of the executive branch from personally and substantially
participating in matters in which the officer or employee personally, or through
his or her family, “general partner,” or affiliated organization, has a financial
interest. To comply with this provision, the officer or employee must recuse
himself or herself from participating in the relevant matter.
However, in 1974 following President Gerald Ford’s nomination of Nelson
A. Rockefeller to the office of Vice President of the United States, the U.S.
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) advised the Senate that this provision does not
apply to the president (or vice president). The DOJ found that “[t]he effect of
applying section 208 to the President is certainly either to disable him from
performing some of the functions prescribed by the constitution or to establish
a qualification for his serving as President (to wit, elimination of financial

24 Larry Buchanan and Karen Yourish, The Array of Conflicts of Interest Facing the Trump Presidency,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/01/us/politics/trump-conflict-ofinterests.html.
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conflicts) beyond those contained in the Constitution.” 25 Congress expressly
codified the exemptions in 1989. As further explained by a report issued by the
Congressional Research Service in October 2016, if subject to Section 208, the
president could potentially be conflicted out of any given executive action,
ultimately interfering with his or her exercise of constitutional duties. 26
In addition to Section 208 is the until-recently lesser-known “Emoluments
Clause.” This provision of the Constitution states that “no person holding any
Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of Congress,
accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from
any king, prince or foreign state.” 27 In other words, the president cannot
receive gifts from foreign governments without the consent of Congress. This
is not just an anti-bribery clause—the Emoluments Clause is broader than any
bribery statute in that it does not require the president actually take any
reciprocating action to trigger the clause. The Emoluments Clause seems to
aim at eliminating even the air of potential influence.
The Emoluments Clause remains somewhat enigmatic given that it has
lived in near obscurity, leading to disagreement as to whether the clause would
even apply to the president. However, in its December 7, 2009 opinion as to
whether it would apply to President Obama’s receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize,
the DOJ determined that the president “surely” fell within the definitional
scope of the clause. 28 The DOJ further stated in a footnote that “[c]orporations
owned or controlled by a foreign government are presumptively foreign states
under the Emoluments Clause,” and thus a gift from such a corporation could
trigger the clause. 29
While under the law a corporation is a distinct “person,” that argument is
harder to make for a privately held entity such as the Trump Organization
conglomerate or any number of Trump’s other privately held entities.
Arguably, any business transaction between Mr. Trump personally (or an
entity privately held by Mr. Trump) and a foreign government (or a foreign25 Letter from Laurence H. Silberman, Acting Attorney General, to the Honorable Howard W. Cannon,
Chairman, Committee on Rules and Administration (Sep. 20, 1974), available at https://fas.org/irp/agency/
doj/olc/092074.pdf, at p. 4.
26 “Conflicts of Interest and the Presidency,” CRS LEGAL SIDEBAR (Oct. 14, 2016), available at
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/conflicts.pdf.
27 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
28 David J. Barron, Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act to
the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. O.L.C. 1, 4 (2009), https://www.
justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2010/10/31/goteborg_award_0.pdf.
29 Id.
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government controlled company) that is anything less than a fair-value, armslength transaction would trigger the clause. A more expansive view of the
Emoluments Clause is that any transaction between Trump or a privately-held
Trump entity and a foreign government or foreign-government controlled
company, regardless of the terms, would violate the clause. Even under the
more narrow reading, it seems nearly impossible to keep track of any
potentially violative transaction, leaving Mr. Trump to self-police any such
actions. The fact that Mr. Trump intends to turn control of his empire over to
his children does not remove him from potential violation under the clause.
The Emoluments Clause is concerned with ownership, not management.
Somewhat unclear is whether a gift to Trump’s children could potentially
trigger the clause given their dual roles as the representatives of his companies
and close advisors.
Currently, there is some uncertainty as to whether anyone would actually
have legal standing to bring a claim under the Emoluments Clause. 30 A recent
white paper issued by the Brookings Institute stated that the clause could be
enforced through Congressional impeachment, based upon the president’s
knowing and intentional violation of the Constitution. 31 Private parties might
have standing based upon prior Supreme Court decisions supporting that a
party has standing to challenge an unlawful benefit received by a competitor
because the judgment would end injury in the form of being placed in a
comparative disadvantage, even if the challenging party cannot show that they
would have otherwise definitely received the benefit. 32
In the alternative, Congress could potentially create a private right of action
allowing competitors of Trump-entities to file suit against Mr. Trump under
the Emoluments Clause for declaratory and injunctive relief. 33
In sum, while at least currently the president is not subject to conflict of
interest standards under Section 208, it is almost certain that Mr. Trump’s
business dealings would result in a violation of the Emoluments Clause.

30 Jonathan Adler, The Emoluments Clause—is Donald Trump violating its letter or spirit?, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/11/21/theemoluments-clause-is-donald-trump-violating-its-letter-or-spirit/?utm_term=.317d7998537a#comments.
31 Norman L. Eisen, et al., The Emoluments Clause: It’s Text, Meaning and Application to Donald J.
Trump, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (Dec. 16, 2016), at pp. 21-22, available at https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/gs_121616_emoluments-clause1.pdf.
32 Id.
33 Id.
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What’s the Big Deal?
Mr. Trump’s potential conflicts extend much farther than a simple concern
that he might stand to financially benefit from some executive decisions. In
addition to the obvious concern that Mr. Trump may be subconsciously, if not
consciously, motivated to make decisions based upon the effect they would
have on his personal finances, equally, if not more concerning are the overall
perception of the American citizenry in the transparency of their government
and confidence in the rule of law, as well as the maintenance of America’s
foreign policy and diplomatic relations with foreign governments.
The foundation of a strong government requires trust, and trust requires
transparency. The federal government’s level of transparency has become an
increasingly important issue for Americans. However, knowing that he stands
to profit from his political decisions creates an inherent tension between the
President and the citizenry. While Trump has dismissed any concerns that his
decision-making abilities will be impaired by these business interests, studies
have concluded that even when humans are aware of potential outside
influences and actively attempt to avoid such influences when making
decisions, it is nearly impossible to escape the effects of unconscious bias. 34
Even if Trump is able to completely separate his constitutional duties from his
personal business interests, his recent actions in meeting with business
associates after publicly vowing to cede control over his companies and
appointing his children to actively participate in the selection of the leaders
who will regulate the Trump empire undermine the appearance of a clear
separation between these interests.
Moreover, as discussed above, the avoidance of conflicts of interest is
fundamental to our system of due process. Necessary to the assurance of our
liberties is a transparent and effective legal system. It is a basic right of any
defendant to have a judge who is free from conflict of interest, and the right of
any party to a litigation to be represented by an attorney who is free from
conflicting interests. Yet now, we have a president who, along with the future
managers of his global empire, are hand-selecting the people who will
adjudicate legal proceedings in which the president has enormous personal
34

See e.g., Don A. Moore, et al., Conflict of interest and intrusion of bias, Judgment and Decision
Making, Vol. 5, No. 1, February 2010, pg. 38, available at http://journal.sjdm.org/10/91104/jdm91104.pdf;
Smith, Richard, Conflicts of interest: how money clouds objectivity, J R Soc Med. 2006 Jun; 99(6): 292–97,
available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1472724/; Brekke N. Wilson TD, Mental
contamination and mental correction: unwanted influences on judgments and evaluations, PSYCHOL BULL.
1994 Jul; 116(1):117-42. (p. 117), available at http://www.people.virginia.edu/~tdw/wilson&brekke.1994.pdf.
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financial conflicts of interest. It would be beyond naive to believe that these
decisions could be made impartially. Even if they were, it is similarly difficult
to believe that an appointee or subordinate of the president would be
uninhibited in knowingly making a decision that would have significant,
adverse financial effects on the president. This situation cripples due process,
and eviscerates trust in the rule of law.
Mr. Trump’s business holdings also undermine America’s use of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to stop contractors from paying bribes to secure
government work abroad. Mr. Trump has deals in many countries where
kickbacks and under-the-table payments are considered a normal part of local
business. How can the administration denounce this sort of behavior when the
president’s own companies are arguably engaging in it? This is especially true
for projects where Mr. Trump has merely leased the use of his name, and thus
is profiting from the deal but is unable to confirm the legality of underlying
transaction.
Mr. Trump’s international holdings also add an additional level of
complexity to already complicated international relationships. Foreign leaders
will undoubtedly try and ingratiate themselves with Trump by either
supporting Trump businesses, as discussed above with foreign patronage of the
Old Post Office hotel, or by providing Trump businesses favorable financing
terms or regulatory environments. After all, how could someone sit across the
negotiating table from one of Trump’s children and not think they are
effectively dealing with the President himself? If your biggest client asks you
to give her kid a job, are you really going to tell her no?
Even an absence of favoritism could lead to issues. For example, a foreign
leader may, based upon his or her particular culture or customs, have certain
expectations that he or she will receive a benefit in exchange for providing
some direct or indirect benefit to a Trump business. If that leader does not
believe he or she received a “quo” for their “quid,” there could be political
retaliation.
What Can Be Done?
While the concept of allowing the president unfettered ability to carry out
his or her constitutional duties sounds ideal, this vision seems no longer
possible in a world where the president-elect is willing to make a personal
appeal to a foreign leader to carry out privately motivated political action, as
has been suggested is the case with the recent conversation between Trump
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and Mr. Farage. To borrow of Erik Jensen in his op-ed about the Clinton
Foundation’s receipt of gifts from foreign governments while Hillary Clinton
served as secretary of state, “[w]hether or not the practice could have survived
review by lawyers in green eyeshades, I’m not sure. But the practice
smelled. . . .” 35 The thought of any high ranking government official exploiting
their office for personal financial gain, either directly or indirectly, “violate[s]
the spirit, if not the language” of the law.
The president must be able to carry out his constitutional duties, but does
this require a complete exemption from conflict of interest laws? The argument
that any conflict of interest regulations would potentially impede upon the
president’s ability to carry out his office rests on the assumption that the
president-elect would decline to divest himself or herself of the interests
creating the conflict—e.g. placing the interests in a blind trust. Had the drafters
of the Constitution anticipated that someday one person could amass such
wealth and global influence, and show such disregard for separation of
personal and official interests, they undoubtedly would have included some
mechanism for limiting such conflicts. The essence of such an ideology is
clearly appreciated in the Emoluments Clause.
The likely effect of subjecting the presidency to some form of conflict of
interest law that requires such an action would be a self-selection of
candidates. For example, given the expanse of Trump’s business holdings, it is
possible that a conflict of interest would be simply unavoidable short of
requiring him to divest ownership of his empire. It is entirely conceivable that
Trump would not have run would he have been required to sell off all interests
in Trump businesses. The logical argument against such a move would be that
we should not institute regulations that dissuade successful and motivated
individuals from running for presidency. However, the concept of conflict of
interests does not exist in a vacuum. As discussed above, in the case of
President-elect Trump, the numerous potential conflicts of interest pose a very
real threat to both American confidence in the federal government and foreign
government relations. While the very idea of a law that established
qualifications exceeding those contained in the Constitution was dismissed by
the DOJ in its 1974 letter concerning Vice President Rockefeller, the
dichotomy between both the possibility for global influence and the personal
reactions to potential conflicts of Vice President Rockefeller and Mr. Trump
35 Erik M. Jensen, Opinion, CLEVELAND.COM (Sept. 23, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.
ssf/2016/09/pay_to_play_and_presents_from.html.
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render these two circumstances factually distinguishable. In fact, the Brookings
Institute recently suggested that Congress could potentially, under the
Necessary and Proper Clause and the Emolument Clause’s recognition of the
“Consent of Congress,” pass legislation imposing restrictions on the
president’s ability to own business or assets that may receive foreign gifts or
emoluments.
Balancing the desire to have the most capable candidates against the desire
to prevent conflicts of interest simply might require foregoing the miniscule
percentage of the population that either is unable to or unwilling to eliminate
significant conflicts of interest prior to assuming office. Given that this is only
the second time in over 200 years that this situation has arisen, and the first
time ever for the president, there is little evidence to suggest we would be
losing a substantial number of candidates.
Conclusion
Mr. Trumps’ potential conflicts of interest upon assuming the presidency in
January 2017 are numerous and real. The conflicts pose a direct threat to the
administration of the rule of law, confidence in due process and transparency
in government, and pose difficult challenges to foreign policies and relations.
While the Emoluments Clause has emerged for the first time in American
history as a potentially necessary weapon, the DOJ and Congress should
consider—given the novelty of the global community and the current actions
of our President-elect—in revising their prior stance on the feasibility of
subjecting the president to some form of conflict-of-interest standards, even if
this results in a limiting qualification for those who can assume the office
without divesting personal assets.

